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Recent Developments 
Republic National Bank 0/ Miami v. 
UnitedStates: REMOVAL OF THE 
RES FROM THE DISTRICT DOES 
NOT DIVEST THE COURT OF 
APPEALS OF JURISDICTION IN 
AN IN REM FORFEITURE AC-
TION. 
In Republic National Bank 0/ Mi-
ami v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 554 
(1992), the United States Supreme Court 
held that in a civil forfeiture proceed-
ing, a transfer of the res outside of the 
district by the prevailing party does not 
preclude the court of appeals from ex-
ercising jurisdiction over the action. 
Supplementing its prior decisions with 
the policy rationale of common sense 
and fairness, the Court rejected the 
United States Government's argument 
that maintaining jurisdiction over an in 
rem forfeiture claim requires continu-
ous control over the res. 
In February 1988, the Government 
instituted civil forfeiture proceedings in 
the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Florida against a 
single-family home in Coral Gables. 
The Government alleged that the owner 
had purchased the house with proceeds 
from narcotics trafficking, thereby sub-
jecting the property to forfeiture under 
the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Pre-
vention and Control Act of 1970, 92 
Stat. 3777, (1970)(current version at 
21 U.S.C. § 881 (a)(6». The Republic 
National Bank of Miami filed an action 
asserting a lien interest in the property 
under a mortgage it had secured. Atthe 
Government's request, the Bank agreed 
to sell the home and to pennit the Mar-
shal to retain the earnings pending de-
termination of the action. 
The district court denied the bank's 
claim and forfeited the proceeds to the 
United States pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 
881 (a)(6). Thereafter the bank filed a 
notice of appeal, but it neglected to seek 
a stay of the judgment's execution to 
freeze the assets. The Government· 
transferred its award to the Forfeiture 
Fund of the United States Treasury, and 
then filed a motion to dismiss the appeal 
for lack of jurisdiction. The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit granted the Government's 
motion and concluded that the removal 
from the district of the proceeds from 
the sale of the property defeated its in 
rem jurisdiction over the action. The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari, cit-
ing an inconsistency among the circuits 
as to the disposition on appeal of prop-
erty awarded to the Government in civil 
forfeiture proceedings. 
In reaching its decision, the Court, 
citing United States v. One Assortment 
0/89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984), 
recognized that a valid seizure ofthe res 
is required prior to the initiation of an in 
rem forfeiture proceeding. Republic 
National Bank a/Miami, 113 S. Ct. at 
557. The Court reasoned that the sei-
zure of the disputed property and the 
publication of the fact that proceedings 
have been instituted constitutes the func-
tional equivalent of service of process. 
ld. at 557-58. The Justices, however, 
declined to extend beyond the initial 
determination of jurisdiction the re-
quirement that the res be seized and 
maintained within the district. 
The Court rejected the Government's 
proposition that maintaining in rem ju-
risdiction requires continued control of 
the res. Referring to its decision in The 
Rio Grande, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 458 
(1875), the Court stated that, with cer-
tain narrow exceptions, once the power 
to hear a case in rem attaches, any 
circumstances that arise following the 
proper exercise of original jurisdiction 
will not operate to divest a court of its 
capacity to decide the matter. Republic 
National Bank a/Miami, 113 S. Ct. at 
558. Reasoning that the concept of in 
rem jurisdiction was developed prima-
rily to augment the court's ability to 
hear certain cases rather than to provide 
a means of defeating an adversary's 
claim, the majority concluded that the 
rule asserted by the Government did not 
exist. Id. at 559. Accordingly, main-
taining control over the res is not a 
prerequisite to the continued exercise of 
in rem jurisdiction. 
The Court, however, did recognize 
limited circumstances where the treat-
ment of property after the institution of 
an action would preclude a court from 
deciding a case. In situations where the 
plaintiff abandons the res or where the 
property in dispute is otherwise 
unobtainable, a court will not adjudi-
cate the matter because of the inability 
to enforce its decision. !d. The Court 
noted that these exceptions relateexclu-
sively to the policies of rendering only 
enforceable judgments and of giving 
fair notice to the parties. Id. Nonethe-
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less, such considerations did not oper-
ate to dissolve the court's power to hear 
the case at bar. 
The Court also rejected the 
Government's contention that, because 
funds deposited in the United States 
Treasury may be released only by a 
congressional appropriation under Art. 
I, § 9, Cl. 7 of the United States Consti-
tution, any judgment handed down 
would necessarily be "useless" within 
the meaning of the exception to appel-
late jurisdiction discussed above. Id. at 
560. The Court reasoned that in 31 
U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) Congress has pro-
vided for the refund of funds that are 
erroneously received. Id. In addition, 
28 U.S.C. § 2465 states that property 
seized under any act of Congress shall 
be returned following the disposition of 
judgment in the defendant's favor. 
Under the Court's interpretation ofthese 
statutes, a formal appropriation would 
not be required under these circum-
stances. Id. at 561. Because the funds 
would be returned to their rightful owner 
following a favorable judgment, the 
Court concluded that a decision in the 
bank's favor would thus be enforce-
able. Id. 
Justice Thomas, in a concurring 
opinion, stated that he would have ap-
plied § 1521 of the Housing and Com-
munity Development Act of 1992, 106 
Stat. 3672, which amended 28 V.S.c. § 
1355. Section 1521, which the Presi-
dent signed on October 28, 1992, pro-
vides that the removal of property by a 
prevailing party in a civil forfeiture 
action does not deprive the appellate 
court of jurisdiction in the matter. The 
majority expressly declined to interpret 
the statute or to determine its retroac-
tive effect. Republic National Bank of 
Miami, 113 S. Ct. at 560 n.5. Justice 
Thomas, however, believed the Court 
should have applied the principle rec-
ognized in United States v. Alabama, 
362 U.S. 602 (1960), that new laws 
which enlarge jurisdiction apply to cases 
currently pending before a court. 
Republic National Bank of Miami 
v. United States represents a refusal by 
the Court to curtail the right of property 
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owners to appeal an adverse decision in 
civil forfeiture proceedings brought by 
the Government. In declining to inter-
pret the retroactive effect of § 1521 of 
the Housing and Conununity Develop-
ment Act of 1992, the Court indicated 
that, even absent such a statute, it would 
not pernlit tl1e Government to escape a 
full adjudication of a civil forfeiture 
claim on technical procedural grounds. 
Based on this decision, owners of prop-
erty seized by the Government pursuant 
to 21 V.S.C. § 881(a)(6) will beguar-
an teed the right to appeal a district 
court ruling forfeiting title to their prop-
erty to the United States. 
-Scott N Alperin 
Crosby v. United States: CRIMI-
NAL TRIAL MAY NOT PROCEED 
IF DEFENDANT IS NOT 
PRESENT AT COMMENCE-
MENT OF TRIAL. 
In Crosby v. United States, 113 S. 
Ct. 748 (1993), the United States Su-
preme Court held that Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 43 prohibits a trial 
in absentia of a defendant who is not 
present at the commencement of trial. 
In arriving at this holding, the Court 
examined the express language, the his-
tory, and the logic of the Rule. 
Michael Crosby and others were 
indicted on several counts of mail fraud 
by a federal grandjury in the District of 
Minnesota. He and his codefendants 
were accused of devising a scheme to 
fraudulently sell military-veteran com-
memorative medallions. Crosby ap-
peared before a federal magistrate and 
pleaded not guilty. He was condition-
ally released from detention upon agree-
ing to post a bond and remain in the 
state. He attended pretrial conferences 
and hearings with his attorney and was 
advised of the trial date. 
Crosby, however, did not appear for 
his trial in the United States District 
Court for the District of Minnesota. 
Deputy marshals attempted to locate 
him but were unsuccessful. The court 
expressed concern over the delay be-
cause the pool of potential jurors was 
waiting and the delay could have inter-
fered with the court's calendar. The 
prosecutor noted that Crosby's attor-
ney and codefendants were present and 
that it would be difficult for her to 
reschedule the case due to the age and 
health problems of some of the wit-
nesses. 
The district court suggested that the 
trial begin despite Crosby's absence, 
and Crosby's attorney objected. TIle 
Governnlent fOfl1lally requested that the 
trial conunence because Crosby was 
still not located after several days of 
search, and Crosby's bond was for-
feited. 
The court stated for the record its 
findings that Crosby had adequate no-
